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This article by Basil Markesinis and Jdrg Fedtke may be a turning
point. It will encourage generations of judges to try the path of
comparative law. We may have here the beginning of an intellectual
revolution. In the past, we had the following phenomena: Judges did
not tend to rely on comparative law; lawyers did not cite comparative
law to judges; law schools did not stress comparative law; scholars did
not emphasize comparative law; judges did not tend to rely on
comparative law; and so on. This vicious circle is coming to its end.
Judges will start to rely on comparative law; lawyers willtend to cite it
to judges; law schools will start teaching comparative law; scholars
will be encouraged to research in comparative law; judges will rely
more and more on comparative law. And one of the important tools in
breaking the vicious circle is this article of Markesinis and Fedtke. In
what will follow, I am summarizing my own experience in the use of
comparative law in public law. I do hope it may encourage other
judges to follow in this path, both in public law and in private law.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
I have found comparative law to be of great assistance in
realizing my role as a judge. The case law of the courts of the United
States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany have
* President of the Supreme Court of Israel. This Article is adapted from a section
in President Barak's book, The Judge in a Democracy, and will also appear with Sir Basil
Markesinis's substantially enlarged article that will be published in book form by Cavendish
Press, England, under the title Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of
Inspiration? Both are scheduled to appear in the spring of 2006.
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helped me significantly in finding the right path to follow. Indeed,
comparing oneself to others allows for greater self-knowledge. With
comparative law, the judge expands the horizon and the interpretive
field of vision. Comparative law enriches the options available to us.
In different legal systems, similar legal institutions often fulfill
corresponding roles, and similar legal problems (like hate speech,
privacy, and now the fight against terrorism) arise.' To the extent that
these similarities exist, comparative law becomes an important tool
with which judges fulfill their role in a democracy ("microcompari-
son") Moreover, because many of the basic principles of democracy
are common to democratic countries, there is good reason to compare
them ("macrocomparison")' Indeed, different democratic legal
systems often encounter similar problems. Examining a foreign
solution may help a judge choose the best local solution. This
usefulness applies both to the development of the common law and to
the interpretation of legal texts.'
Naturally, one must approach comparative law cautiously,
remaining cognizant of its limitations. Comparative law is not merely
the comparison of laws. A useful comparison can exist only if the
legal systems have a common ideological basis. The judge must be
sensitive to the uniqueness of each legal system. Nonetheless, when
the judge is convinced that the relative social, historical, and religious
circumstances create a common ideological basis, it is possible to refer
to a foreign legal system as a source of comparison and inspiration.
Indeed, the importance of comparative law lies in extending the judge's
horizons. Comparative law awakens judges to the potential latent in
their own legal systems. It informs judges about the successes and
failures that may result from adopting a particular legal solution. It
refers judges to the relationship between a solution to the legal
problem before them and other legal problems. Thus, comparative law
acts as an experienced friend. Of course, there is no obligation to refer
to comparative law. Additionally, even when comparative law is
consulted, the final decision must always be "local." The benefit of
1. See Police v. Georghiades, [1983] 2 C.L.R. 33 (Cyprus). Justice Pikis compared
different national and international legal systems to give content to the right of privacy. It
was decided by the Supreme Court of Cyprus that the right of privacy applies not only vis-
a-vis the state but also in the relationships between individuals. Id at 50-54, 60-65.
2. See 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEEN KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 5
(Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1987) (1977).
3. Id. at 4-5.
4. See Tim KooPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A CoMPARAnvE
VIEW 4 (2003).
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comparative law lies in expanding judicial thinking about the possible
arguments, legal trends, and decisionmaking structures available.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Comparative law is a tool that aids in constitutional and statutory
interpretation. This assistance may work on three levels. The fist
concerns interpretive theory. Comparative law helps the judge better
understand the role of interpretation and the role of the judge therein.
To exemplify the point, consider the interpretative status of the intent
of the creator in understanding constitutions and statutes. Before
judges decide their own position on the issue, they would do well to
consider how other legal systems treat the question. The second level
on which judges rely on comparative law is connected with
democracy's fundamental values. Democracies share common
fundamental values. Democracy must infringe certain fundamental
values in order to maintain others. It is important for judges to know
how foreign law treats this question and what techniques it uses. Does
it employ a technique of balancing or of categorization? Why is one
technique preferred over another? Every legal system grapples with
the issue of constitutional limitations on human rights. What are these
limitations and what technique was used to reach them? What are the
remedies for violating an unlawful order and how can they be
determined? The t/ird level of aid provided by comparative law
concerns the solutions it offers to specific situations: How protected is
racist speech? Is affirmative action recognized? How does the foreign
system deal with terrorism? Of course, the resolution of these issues is
intrinsically local. In different legal systems, however, they have a
common core in that they reflect the problems of democracy and the
complexity of human relations. Again, I do not advocate adopting the
foreign arrangement. It is never binding. I just advocate an open
approach, one which recognizes that for all our singularity, we are not
alone. That recognition will enrich our own legal systems if we take
the trouble to understand how others respond in situations similar to
those we encounter.
II. COMPARATIVE LAW AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Comparative law is an important source from which the judge
may learn the objective purpose of a statute.' This is the case with
5. See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 148 (Sai Bashi trans.,
2005). For a discussion of comparative law and the courts, see generally COMPARATIVE
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regard to both the specific purpose, or microcomparison, and the
general purpose, or macrocomparison, of the statute. The comparison
is relevant even if it is clear that the legislature was not inspired by
foreign law. In looking for the specific statutory purpose, a judge may
be inspired by a similar statute in a foreign democratic legal system.
This is so when he wishes to learn of the purpose underlying
legislation that regulates a legal "institution" such as an agency or a
lease. The judge does not refer to the details of the foreign laws.
Rather, he examines the function that the legal institution fulfills in the
two systems. If there is a similarity in the functions, he may find
interpretive ideas about the (objective) purpose of the legislation. An
example of this potential use is the principle of good faith in executing
a contract. To the extent that this principle fulfills a similar function in
different legal systems, it is possible to use the law of a foreign system
to discern the purpose that underlies the principle of good faith in local
law. Moreover, it is possible to use comparative law-from other
national systems and from international law-to determine the general
(objective) purpose that reflects the basic principles of the system.
Again, however, this comparative analysis is possible only if the two
legal systems share a common ideological basis.
V COMPARATIVE LAW AND INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONS
Comparative law can help judges determine the objective
purpose of a constitution. Democratic countries have several
fundamental principles in common. As such, legal institutions often
fulfill similar functions across countries. From the purpose that one
given democratic legal system attributes to a constitutional
arrangement, one can learn something about the purpose of that
particular constitutional arrangement in another legal system. Indeed,
comparative constitutional law is a good source of expanded horizons
LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds.,
2003); PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (2d ed. 1999);
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITONS IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1999);
INT'L ACAD. OF COMPARATIVE LAW, THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS
(Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef Van Erp eds., 1999); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER 65-79 (2004); Giinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons Re-thinking Comparative
Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1995); H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and Legal
Pmctice: On Removing the Borders, 75 TuL. L. REv 977 (2001); Basil Markesinis,
Comparative Law-A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002).
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and cross fertilization of ideas across legal systems.' This is clearly the
case when the constitutional text of one country has been influenced
by the constitutional text of another. But even in the absence of any
direct or indirect influence of one constitutional text on another, there
is still a basis for interpretative inspiration. An example is where a
constitution refers expressly to democratic values or democratic
societies.7 But even without such a reference, the interpretative
influence of comparative law is substantial.8 This is the case with
regard to determining the scope of human rights, resolving particularly
difficult issues such as abortion and the death penalty, and determining
constitutional remedies.
Nonetheless, as we have seen, interpretive inspiration is only
useful if there is an ideological basis common to the two legal systems
and a common allegiance to basic democratic principles. A common
basis of democracy is, however, a necessary but insufficient condition
for comparative analysis. As judges, we must also examine whether
there are factors in the historical development and social conditions
that make the local and foreign systems different enough to render
6. For more on the influences of comparative constitutional law, see George P.
Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMp. L. 683, 695-96
(1998); Kathryn A. Perales, It Works Fine in Europe, So Why Not Here? Comparative Law
and Constitutional Federalism, 23 VT. L. REv. 885, 886-91, 901-05 (1998); Lorraine E.
Weinib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in DEFINING THE
FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 23-29 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet
eds., 2002). See generally NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003) (presenting issues and possible solutions in
comparative constitutional law); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999) (same); FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON:
JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES (2000)
(comparing various aspects of the constitutions of the subject countries and proposing
guidelines for constitutional comparison in general); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization mn Search
of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J.
819 (1999) (examining various approaches to comparative constitutional
interpretation); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LEGAL HISTORY 29 (Katherine O'Donovan & Gerry R. Rubin eds., 2000) (discussing trends
in the application of comparative constitutional interpretation to issues of individual rights);
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225
(1999) (evaluating three approaches to comparative constitutional interpretation).
7. See, e.g., Constitution Act 1982, pt. 1, § 38, Canada Act 1982, sched. B, ch. 11
(U.K.), repintedin R.S.C. No. 44 (app. B); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36(1); see also David M.
Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 79, 102-
09(2001).
8. See generally Donald P Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685 (1975) (discussing the viability of comparative
constitutional law as an academic subject and as a legal discipline).
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interpretive inspiration impracticable But when there is an adequate
similarity, interpretive inspiration is possible. This is the case with
regard to inspiration from the law of another democratic country. It is
also true with regard to interpretive inspiration from international law,
as various international conventions enshrine constitutional values.'"
These conventions influence the formation of the objective purpose of
different constitutional texts." The case law of international and
national courts that interpret these conventions ought to serve as a
basis for the interpretation of the constitutions of various nations.
V USE OF CoMPARATiVE LAW IN PRACTICE
The use of comparative law for the development of the common
law and the interpretation of legal texts is determined by the tradition
of the legal system. Israeli law, for example, makes extensive use of
comparative law. When Israeli courts encounter an important legal
problem, they frequently examine foreign law. Reference to law from
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia is
commonplace.'2 Those with the linguistic ability also refer to
Continental European law and, sometimes, we use English translations
of Continental European (mainly German, French, and Italian) legal
literature.
In countries of the British Commonwealth, there is much cross
fertilization. Each such nation refers to United Kingdom case law.
United Kingdom judges refer to Commonwealth case law and
Commonwealth judges, in turn, refer to each other's case law. The
9. See, e.g., McQueen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 740; Rahey v. The Queen,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 ("While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to
refer to American constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of
Charter guarantees that have counterparts in the United States Constitution, they should be
wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries in
different ages and in very different circumstances...."). See genemlly PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 827-28 (4th ed. 1997).
10. For the products of some of the most important international conventions, see
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 17;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, Doc. 21 rev. 6, 1948, OASTS; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217(IH)A, at 71, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., 183rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948).
11. See, e.g., Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1997) 190 C.L.R.
513, 655 (Austl.).
12. See Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel Jurisprudence of Free Speech,
9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21, 24 (1981); Rene Sanilevici, The Use of Comparatve Law by
IsAMeli Courts, h INT'L AcAD. OF COMPARATIvE LAw, supm note 5, at 197.
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Supreme Court of Canada is particularly noteworthy for its frequent
and fruitful use of comparative law." As such, Canadian law serves as
a source of inspiration for many countries around the world. Generous
use of comparative law can also be found in the opinions of the South
African Constitutional Court. In South Africa's Constitution, it is
explicitly determined that: "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a
court, tribunal, or forum--(a) must promote the values that underlie an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom; (b) must consider international law; and, (c) may consider
foreign law."'"
Regrettably, until very recently, the United States Supreme Court
has made little use of comparative law.'5 Many democratic countries
derive inspiration from this Court, particularly in its interpretation of
the United States Constitution.'6 By contrast, some justices of the
Supreme Court do not cite foreign case law in their judgments. They
fail to make use of an important source of inspiration, one that
enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the
democratic ties and foundations of different legal systems. Justice
Claire UHeureux-Dub6 of the Canadian Supreme Court has rightly
observed that "[i]f we continue to learn from each other, we as judges,
lawyers, and scholars will contribute in the best possible way not only
to the advancement of human rights but to the pursuit of justice itself,
wherever we are."'7 Of course, American law in general, and its
13. See Anne E Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts, in
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 295, 310 (Benedetto
Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997).
14. S.AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1).
15. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) ("Justice
Breyer's dissent would have us consider the benefits that other countries, and the European
Union, believe they have derived from federal systems that are different from ours. We
think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution
.."); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that it is
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners
and their various amici ... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant'");
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
plurality's reliance upon Amnesty International's account of what it pronounces to be
civilized standards of decency in other countries ... is totally inappropriate as a means of
establishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation.").
16. See Gerard V La Forest, The Use of Ameican Precedents in Canadian Courts,
46 ME. L. REV. 211 (1994). See generally Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the
American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537 (1988) (discussing the use of
American concepts of rights by foreign courts).
17. See Claire ULHeureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization,
The Rehnquist Court, and Human Rights, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002).
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constitutional law in particular, is rich and developed. American law is
comprised of not one but fifty-one legal systems. Nonetheless, I think
that it is always possible to learn new things even from other
democratic legal systems that, in their turn, have learned from
American law. As Judge Guido Calabresi rightly said: "Wise parents
do not hesitate to learn from their children."' 8 There appears to be the
beginning of a change in the United States Supreme Court's attitude
towards comparative law. In some recent cases, Supreme Court
justices have cited case law from other jurisdictions.'9 Is this Court
moving toward wider use of comparative law?
18. United States v. Then, 56 E3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).
19. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003); Atkins v. Virgina, 531
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
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